A FEW MORE QUESTIONS ABOUT "Our North, Strong and Free" HELICOPTERS, WHAT HELICOPTERS?

In their latest Defence policy "Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence" the government announced that they would " provide the Canadian Armed Forces with the speed and airlift capacity to assert Canada’s sovereignty and respond to natural disasters and emergencies throughout the country, we will acquire a more modern, mobile and effective tactical helicopter capability."

There are several obvious candidates to fill the tactical helicopter role for the Canadian Armed Forces.

One would be the Bell UH-1Y "Venom". The Bell UH-1Y is a twin-engine, medium-sized utility helicopter built by Bell Helicopter as one of the latest members of the numerous Huey family of helicopters, a family which includes the Bell CH-146 "Griffon", the current tactical helicopter used by the Canadian Armed Forces. 

As an evolved version of the aircraft currently in use it would be a natural and comparatively easy transition for pilots and maintainers.  As it is currently in service with the U.S. Marines it can be expected to be in service for many years with spares, upgrades, and even doctrine being easily available. Costs for both initial purchase and maintenance should also be relatively straight forward given U.S. experience.

The other obvious choice to fill the role would be some variant of the Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk. In wide spread use in a number of countries as well as the U.S. Army, it is in production with upgrades and spares available for decades to come. Sharing engine commonality with the currently in service Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone it would a safe and cost effective choice.

Another reasonable choice to fill the role of a modern, mobile and effective tactical helicopter capability would be a troop carrying variant of the CH-148 Cyclone. Currently in service with the RCAF, the CH-148 is a military variant of the Sikorsky S-92 designed for shipboard operations, it replaced, after much time and money was spent, the CH-124 Sea King.

The H-92 is the military version of the S-92 from which the CH-148 is derived. In the utility transport role it is capable of carrying 22 troops and can also be configured for specific missions, including search and rescue and executive transportation. The choice of a CH-148 variant to fill the role would bring the commonality of spares, equipment and even training that comes with a bigger fleet. This acquisition, with its concomitant savings, could even include a few aircraft, configured for search and rescue, to augment our hard worked and under resourced CH-149 Cormorant SAR fleet.

A less likely but still viable choice would be to purchase more CH-147 heavy lift helicopters. In 2009, Canada signed a contract for 15 of the F model of the aircraft which, inevitably and at great expense, were extensively modified and upgraded for the Canadian Forces, they were delivered in 2013–2014 with the Canadian designation CH-147F.

While not thought of as a 'tactical' helicopter they are often used as such. More to the point, heavy lift helicopters are almost a national asset, as useful for disaster relief as they are for logistic support, you really can't have enough of them. While such a procurement might seem more expensive, in terms of initial purchase cost, savings would be found in the commonality with an existing fleet and its attendant logistics and training infrastructure.

If a purchase of CH-147 Chinook helicopters was paired with a purchase of Bell 429 'Global Rangers' , the same aircraft in service with the Canadian Coast Guard, to be used as a more economically viable aircraft for the purely utility role, there could be further savings. It doesn't hurt that these useful aircraft are manufactured in Canada.

All of the above would be viable choices for the Government intention to "acquire a more modern, mobile and effective tactical helicopter capability" which they suggest in the new Defence policy is a priority. If the procurement was pursued with any sense of urgency the aircraft could be in service within five years at an affordable price.

This will not happen. In five years the Department of National Defence will announce that they are five years away from an option which involves a bespoke aircraft, highly modified for Canadian use and in service no where else in the world which costs twice as much as any of the above options. They will be mistaken, it will take twice as long as predicted and cost three times more then it should.

This last is not a cynical prediction, based on all previous performance and the lack of any real change in our procurement policies, it is a fact.

A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT "Our North, Strong and Free" LONG RANGE MISSILES

 

In a recent statement the Government of Canada has announced that, among other things they intent to acquire "Long-Range Land Missiles" spending"$2.7 billion over 20 years to acquire long-range missile capabilities to enable our forces to deter threats to Canada from an appropriate distance and reach targets at greater ranges than our adversaries in combat."

As well the new policy announcement states that they intend to "explore options to acquire long-range air- and sea-launched missiles to enable our forces to deter threats to Canada from an appropriate distance and reach targets at greater ranges than our adversaries in combat."

It must be assumed that at least some of these new weapons are going to be Tomahawk cruise missiles made by Raytheon Missiles & Defense in the United States as these are the same weapons previously identified as projected for use on the new Canadian Surface Combatants frigates being built for the R.C.N.

For targeting and navigation Tomahawk missiles use a combination of TERCOM or Terrain Contour Matching in which  a digital representation of an area of terrain is mapped based on digital terrain elevation data or stereo imagery. It is not clear if any branch of the Canadian government, military or civilian can supply such data or imagery.

The missile also uses DSMAC or Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation. To do this a digitized image of an area is mapped. During the flight the missile will verify that the images that it has stored correlate with the image it sees below itself. Based on comparison results the missile's inertial navigation system is updated and the missile corrects its course. Again, it is not clear if any branch of the Canadian government, military or civilian can supply such data or imagery.

Is it possible that the Government of Canada is going to acquire long range cruise missiles, a weapon never before found in our arsenal, that can only be used with the assistance, and hence permission, of a third party?

A new day, a new defence policy, a lot of questions. More to come.

P8-A POSEIDON, "A GOOD DAY FOR THE RCAF", NOT REALLY

In what was described in some circles as "A good day for the RCAF" the Government of Canada officially announced plans to replace its fleet of CP-140 Auroras with Boeing’s P8-A Poseidon. According to a press-released issue by National Defence in November of 2023 Canada has finalized a government-to-government agreement with the United States for the acquisition of up to 16 P-8A Poseidon aircraft for the Royal Canadian Air Force. Fourteen multi-mission aircraft will be procured, with options for up to an additional two. It was announced that  the first P-8A should be delivered in 2026, and with an average of one aircraft delivered per month, all of the aircraft could be delivered as early as fall 2027. The government anticipates full operational capability by 2033.

These aircraft, if procured, will join a surprisingly long list of aircraft operated by the RCAF in the maritime reconnaissance role since World War II.

Following the end of the Second World War, Lancaster MK 10 bombers served with the RCAF in several roles. During the 1950s, the RCAF operated seventy heavily modified Lancasters, designated Lancaster 10MR/MPs, as Maritime Reconnaissance and Patrol aircraft in an anti-submarine role.  

The Lancasters served throughout the 1950s, when they were supplemented by the Lockheed Neptune until replaced by the Canadair Argus.

P2V-7 Neptunes, later designated as CP-122's served in the anti-submarine, anti-shipping, and maritime reconnaissance roles as a stopgap between 1955 and 1960 pending deliveries of the Canadair CP-107 Argus. Twenty-five Neptunes served with 404, 405 and 407 squadrons until 1960. 

The thirty-three CP-107 Argus produced by Canadair replaced the last of the Avro Lancasters as well as the Lockheed Neptunes in the 1960's. It was one of the most effective anti-submarine warfare aircraft of its day and a mainstay for the RCAF.

Replacing the Argus was the Lockheed CP-140 Aurora, introduced into service in 1980, it is a maritime patrol aircraft based on the Lockheed P-3 Orion. A total of twenty-one airframes in two different variants were procured.

Busy in the cold war era to support Canada's anti-submarine warfare mission obligations under NATO for the northwest Atlantic sector, as the CP-140 moved into the 21st century the aircraft have increasingly been employed for domestic and international surveillance for security, counter-terrorism and smuggling, as well as to monitor foreign fishing fleets off Canada's coasts. CP-140s have also been deployed on operations such as Operation Assistance and Operation Apollo.

 

The Aurora Incremental Modernization Project (AIMP) began in 1998 to upgrade the electronics mission systems and sensors, currently, the Aurora Structural Life Extension Project (ASLEP),approved in 2008 and completed in 2020, updated and replaced structural components of the aircraft. A total of 14 aircraft were so modified and remain in service.

So, seventy Lancasters, supported by twenty-five Neptunes, were replaced by thirty-three Argus aircraft which in turn were replaced by, originally, twenty-one Auroras, which will be replaced by ''up to sixteen'' P8-A Poseidons. ''Up to'' is a bit of misdirection here, given that Boeing will probably close the production line for these aircraft due to lack of orders, fourteen will almost certainly be the maximum number of Poseidons in Canadian service.

This is not so much "A good day for the RCAF" as it is just another step in a downward spiral.

Some will argue that modern aircraft can travel faster and have better sensors, what is seldom mentioned is that the targets they are searching for are also faster, have better sensors and are often stealthier than their forbearers. It is also true that, like all aircraft that came before them, even the most modern of platforms can not be in two places at the same place. 

Given that the Air Force will need, even in the most optimistic of planning scenarios, two aircraft being used for training or in maintenance for every aircraft available for actual service this means that, at most, Canada will have four or five aircraft available to monitor the longest coastline in the world as well as meeting external treaty obligations and any of the, to be expected, ''unexpected'' demands for these valuable platforms. 

A Good Day? Not really

I'D RATHER HAVE AN AIRFORCE THAN A NATIONAL PHARMACARE PROGRAM

What do Canadians think about Defence?

In a speech to the House of Commons in 1875 by David Mills, an Ontario Liberal MP. said “In a country situated as we are, not likely to be involved in war, and having a large demand upon our resources for public improvements, it is highly desirable to have our military affairs conducted as cheaply as possible." 

It can be argued that for most Canadians this view still reflects the majority of opinion. Unfortunately it is not 1875 and we live in a different world. 

For academics Canadian defence policy can be summed up by a few taglines. Canada wants "A seat at the table", the "commitment-capability gap" depicts the tendency of Canada's defence ambitions to surpass the means allocated to the armed forces, while more cynically some have suggested that politicians normally inquire "how much is just enough?".

For some analysts the idea of "defence against help" is regularly employed to shed light on Ottawa's approach to North American security. Defence against help is a concept identified in the early 1970's by Nils Ørvik as a security strategy for small states. To avoid unwanted “help” from large neighbours he argued that smaller countries had to establish and maintain military credibility.

 

This concept first became clear in Canada  in August 1938 when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt promised that “the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire.” At that time Prime Minister King promised that Canada would ensure that “our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air to the United States, across Canadian territory.”

King’s promise to the United States meant that Canada was no longer free to pursue a completely autonomous defence policy. If Canadians were to prove incapable of providing for their own security, the US would do it for them. This  “involuntary American guarantee” suggests that the United States is likely to defend Canada from external aggression regardless of whether or not Canadians wish to be defended.

Most Canadians may not think it but it can be argued that in our the most important part of our "Defence against Help" can be found in NORAD. If that is indeed the case then our Defence is coming to an end because the time is coming when Canada will discover that it doesn't really have an Air Force.

We don't have enough transport aircraft to meet our stated needs. We don't have enough search and rescue aircraft for a country this size, nor do we have the numbers of long range reconnaissance/patrol aircraft our lengthy coastlines demand. Many of the helicopters we use are aging and we do not have a viable number of lift helicopters.  Even more important, we don't have the personnel to properly maintain and fly the aircraft we do have. All these shortcomings are most evident, and most troubling, in our fighter fleet.

The fleet of operational Cf-18 Hornet jet fighters is currently down to about 37 aircraft.  This fleet size is sufficient only to sustain domestic NORAD operations. In fact it has been announced that the RCAF would withdraw from NATO commitments for the foreseeable future. Even more problematic is the lack of pilots and support personnel, which may even lead to the Air Force being unable to fulfill the NORAD alert mission requirements in full. This will only get worse as the F-35 transition gets underway in the coming years. It is more than likely that there will be insufficient personnel to staff both aircraft types, which will likely result in even fewer available CF-18s to meet the alert role.

Russia is North America’s persistent and proximate threat. The strategic position of Canada, the second-largest country in the world with the longest coastline, is vital to both countries. It needs to be watched and protected. In a fractured world Russia is far from being the only threat to continental security.

What will happen when the United States loses confidence in its northern neighbour to be a stalwart, binational partner? What will happen if the U.S. believes that there is a serious security threat that needs to be met by NORAD and that Canada is not capable of fulfilling our obligations to continental defence?

What will happen is that the commander of NORAD, an American, will take off his NORAD hat and put on his NORTHCOM hat (it should be pointed out here that the commander of NORTHCOM-the U.S. command tasked with defending North America is the same person who commands NORAD) and move the assets he deems necessary from NORTHCOM to NORAD. He may or may not pretend to ask our permission to order changes to areas of responsibility or even t0  move U.S. personal and forces to Canada.

 When that happens, when Canadians realize that not having an Air Force has real world consequences that affect Canadian sovereignty and security, we will blame the politicians for getting us in this mess. 

The politicians will blame the generals and the generals in turn will complain about the politicians. 

The truth is, it will be our fault. Canadian Citizens have not made Defence a priority for their leaders. We have chosen an illusory security and short term gains over real security and long term planning. We have taken the easy way and there will be no one else to blame but ourselves.

So I have decided that the time has come to tell our political leaders something different. If asked in the future I am going to tell anyone who will listen that:

I'D RATHER HAVE AN AIRFORCE THAN A NATIONAL PHARMACARE PROGRAM

  

WHAT THE CLOSING OF THE RED SEA TO COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC MEANS FOR THE FUTURE

 

Forbes Magazine, among other sources, has reported that "Maersk Pauses Shipments Through Red Sea After Recent Houthi Attacks".

 Earlier it had been reported that in reaction to continued attacks on shipping " White House officials said they were working to create an international force to tamp down attacks"

There are those who saw the actions of the Maersk line as a direct reaction to Washington's decision not to respond with over whelming unilateral force. There has been a lot of speculation as to Washington's strategy.

Strategy is, at best, a strange beast. In the words of Sun Tzu "Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat." 

In the western tradition the belief is that governments (hopefully, but not necessarily, democratic in nature) determine war time strategy and then communicate it to the generals who then decide how to achieve the goals they have been given.

This belief is, necessarily, a myth. 

In fact, just as military operations and tactics change in reaction to the enemies actions, strategy changes in the face of shifting political, economic and military circumstances. The same adaptable generals who can easily adjust to changes in enemy tactics can find it difficult to understand changes in direction from the political leadership. By the same token  few politicians have much expertise in operational and tactical military matters. 

In the end Strategy (at least in the western political/military sense) becomes a complicated dance between partners who are not really very good at it.  

I do not believe that what we are seeing in relation the attacks by Houthis, and others, could be deemed as Strategy. What we are seeing is evolution.  

The United States, having grown weary of their role as world policeman and having entered into a political/economic phase in their history where they do not believe they can afford that role, are stepping back. Consumed with internal politics and suspicious of a world they no longer recognize or understand they are leaving the post World War II order they created and which has for so long sustained global order and prosperity.

We are entering a new world. A world in which, almost alone among nations, the United States, since achieving energy self-sufficiency, does not need the rest of the world to survive. We are entering, perhaps re-entering, a period in world history when the complex global interconnections we have grown used to are no longer functioning.

In this world the United States, and with luck a few of their close neigbours, will be able to provide internally or through a combination of economic and military strength, most of the goods and services they need to survive, if not thrive. A world in which for a few favoured nations the situation is ,while perhaps not as good as it used to be, still demonstrably better then the status of other nation states which will neither thrive or, if worst comes to worst, survive. 

The closing of the Red Sea to commercial traffic, and the response to it, are harbingers of the future.

DOES ANYONE REALLY KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON WITH THE CANADIAN SURFACE COMBATANT PROGRAM??

    

On October 24th of this year a letter was sent to the Minister of National Defence questioning the choice of the Leonardo 127/64 Main Gun System for the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) program. Rather to my surprise a reasonably sounding letter was received in reply

 Dear J. G. Murray:

I am writing in response to your email addressed to the Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of National Defence, about the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) program and the choice of deck guns. The Minister has asked the Department of National Defence to review your correspondence and reply on his behalf.

 

Thank you for providing your input and comments on this important matter. I have consulted departmental staff and they have advised me on the following.

 

The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) requirements include the need for a 127mm/5in Main Gun System (MGS). The selected Leonardo 127/64 Vulcano MGS fully meets the RCN’s requirements, and it is a proven weapon system that is in service with various allied navies.

 

There are obvious benefits to have commonality between CSC, the United Kingdom Type 26 and Australian Hunter Class Frigate, all of which are based on a common Type 26 parent ship design. However, in this case it was not feasible for Canada to procure the same MGS being used by the other two nations due to a lack of production line for such gun systems, namely the BAE Mk 45 MGS. While the United Kingdom and Australia are able to reuse existing guns currently in-service within their fleets, Canada does not currently employ a BAE Mk 45 MGS. Accordingly, reusing existing weapons was not possible and it was infeasible to purchase used weapons from other navies to be refurbished for CSC.

 

Canada is confident that the selected MGS is the right solution for the RCN.

 

Thank you for writing, and I hope that this information is helpful.

 

Yours sincerely,

 

Taylor Paxton

National Defence Corporate Secretary

Needless to say this response raised more questions then it answered. I replied as follows.

Taylor Paxton,

 Thank you for your reasonable response to what, in retrospect, seems to me to be an unnecessarily sarcastic letter. Your note does raise several points however. It is still not clear why the RCN requires such a large calibre weapon when they do not seem to have needed one in the last thirty years. Also, on a point of clarification, the Royal Navy has never used a similar weapon and, as they have no such used weapons to update, it must be assumed they are procuring new systems for their Type 26 frigates.

 I am pleased that "Canada is confident that the selected MGS is the right solution for the RCN." but I would be more confident if my last letter to the minister had not been responded to with the following automated reply:

Contact the Minister - Thank you

Thank you for writing to the Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of National Defence. Please be assured your correspondence will be reviewed in due course. However, the whole-of-government approach to limit the spread of the Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) could affect the handling of correspondence, and there may be delays.

Your patience is appreciated.

  Thank you again for your reply and I look forward to hearing from you again regarding this matter. 

Kind regards,

J. G. Murray 

It is hard to understand how it is possible for the Department of National Defence can believe that there is no production available for the BAE Mk 45 MGS. It is even harder to understand why BAE who are both the manufacturer of the gun and part of the design team for the CSC would not have made this clear to them. 

In an attempt to find some answers I have written to BAE as below.

To Whom It May Concern,

I have recently been in correspondence with the office of the Minister of National Defence regarding the choice of main gun armament for the Canadian Surface Combatant frigate program. Specifically, I questioned the choice of the Leonardo 127/64 Vulcano MGS over the BAE Mk 45 MGS as used by our allies on the frigates they are building based, as the CSC is, on the British Type 26.

I was told that “it was not feasible for Canada to procure the same MGS being used by the other two nations due to a lack of production line for such gun systems”. Further it was suggested that those nations were “able to reuse existing guns currently in-service within their fleets”, which struck me as unlikely.

As BAE Systems is the warship design partner on the Canadian Surface Combatant programme and as BAE Systems appears to be marketing the Mk 45 MGS to prospective customers, and providing it to the Australian and British frigate programs, can you tell me if the Department of National Defence is correct in there belief that there is a lack of a production line for these systems.

I look forward to hearing from you with respect to this matter.

Kind regards,

J. G. Murray

In the event any answers are forthcoming I will pass them on. 

Lest we Forget: Sergeant Ernest “Smokey” Smith, VC

 Sergeant (Ret’d) Ernest “Smokey” Smith, VC

It is not clear why anyone would ever choose to join the Canadian Armed Forces.

Ours is not a country that celebrates its military heroes. Our governments have traditionally cared little for those who serve or who have served. It is widely believed that once a year, on November 11, an act of contrition and remembrance when we go through the motions of honouring those who served is more then sufficient to meet our obligations to them.

It must be assumed that those who join must do so for there own reasons.

Earnest Alvia Smith was born on the third of May, 1914, in New Westminster, British Columbia. Like many others Smith struggled to find regular employment during the great depression of the 1930's. In March of 1940 he joined the Canadian Army becoming part of The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. 

Although his armed forces career included episodes of what was characterized as insubordination and inappropriate alcohol consumption Smith achieved the rank of sergeant before he left the army. 

In 1947, Smith wed Esther Weston and they had two children, David and Norma-Jean. After his retirement from the military, Smith opened a travel agency with his wife, "Smith Travel", which was in operation from 1969 to 1992. The couple retired in 1992, and Smith's wife died four years later, in 1996.

 In retirement Smith devoted much of his time to helping his fellow veterans, assisting in Remembrance Day activities and representing veterans at the 2000 consecration ceremonies of Canada's Tomb of the Unknown Soldier having aided in negotiations for the return of those remains.

Smokey Smith died at his home in Vancouver on August 3, 2005, at the age of 91.

 After his death his body was placed in the foyer of the House of Commons to lie in state on August 9, 2005, making him only the ninth person to be accorded this honour; government flags flew at half-mast on that day. He lay in repose at Vancouver's Seaforth Armoury on August 12, with a full military funeral in Vancouver on August 13. His ashes were scattered at sea in the Gulf of Georgia.

These honours were not, as one might hope, those commonly granted to one who has successfully lead a full and productive life, rather they were in remembrance of his service career, one night of that career in particular. 

On the night of October 21/22, 1944 Private Smith was a member of a unit ordered to establish a bridgehead across the Savio River in torrential rain. His three-person PIAT (Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank) team met with a German counterattack of three PzKpfw V Panther tanks, two self-propelled guns, and thirty infantry.

Smith and one companion (Pvt. Tennant) made there way across an open field to acquire a more advantageous position from which to recon and attack the enemy. Almost immediately, one of the German tanks spotted the two and fired, injuring Tennant. Smith moved into firing position with his PIAT, firing it from a distance of merely 10 metres. The tank was disabled, but the German soldiers riding on its back dismounted. rushing Smith who engaged the enemy with his Thompson submachine gun.  As the attack continued Smith held his position until the enemy withdrew, defending his wounded partner and driving the Germans armour and infantry back once more. By the end of the night, one Panther and both self-propelled guns had been destroyed along with numerous enemy soldiers killed or wounded.

In later years Smith would describe the action in simple terms, “Our objective was to cross the river and that's what we did. We got in there and we weren't there too long before we were attacked by tanks.” “In the end there was just Jimmy and I, and then he got wounded so that left only me. So, I had to stay out there by myself.”

The motto of the Canadian Army is "Vigilamus pro te" which is Latin for 'We stand on guard for thee'.  

It is not clear why anyone would ever choose to join the Canadian Armed Forces.

Perhaps in the end it is enough for some to know that they stood with those who Stand on Guard.