Sir Julian Stafford Corbett was born onNovember 12, 1854 in the United Kingdom. He was a prominent British naval historian and geostrategist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A contemporary of the celebrated American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, Corbett’s works helped shape the Royal Navy's reforms of that era. One of his most famous works is “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy”, which remains a classic among students of naval warfare.
Corbett's most important
contribution to the theory of naval warfare was the belief that what mattered
most was not the Mahanian concept of physical destruction of the enemy, but the
act of passage on the sea. Corbett argued that command of the sea was a
relative and not an absolute and could be categorized as general or local,
temporary or permanent. Corbett defined the two fundamental methods of
obtaining control of the lines of communication as the actual physical
destruction or capture of enemy warships and merchants, and or a naval
blockade.
Corbett's concepts, which
seem more and more relevant to modern conflict management, include controlling
the lines of communications, a focus on the enemy, manoeuvre for tactical
advantage, and the importance of the political, economic and financial
dimensions of war as well as the technological and material aspects. He also
understood the primacy of politics in war and in devising an appropriate
strategy to protect the national interests and he stressed the necessity for efficiency
in battle while preserving costly assets.
Sir Julian believed that navies
can do several basic things.
If strong enough, they can
take command of important sea areas for strategically relevant spaces of time.
That usually means wresting control of these spaces from a hostile navy through
battle. When sea control is achieved navies can exploit it by moving people and
materiel without serious interference, land troops, or strike inland or
alternatively not allowing their opponents the ability to do those things
If not strong enough to fight
and win, they can prosecute an “active defense.” Defensive measures include
thwarting a stronger opponent’s plans, or inducing that opponent to weaken
himself while building up superior strength.
Peacetime functions can
include maritime security, the constabulary-like missions navies discharge in
peacetime. Maritime security is an umbrella term for upkeep of the global
system of trade and commerce. Counter-piracy and counter-proliferation are
counted among these functions.
This is what navies can do.
They can dispute command, win command, exploit command and police the sea. Innumerable
subordinate functions all fit within these basic categories. The question then
becomes; what ships are necessary to fulfill these roles in an efficient and
economic fashion?
One suggested answer is the
“light frigate” which in some ways is simply an Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) used as a frigate. The most
prominent example may be the French Floréal class surveillance frigates. It is believed that these vessels can contribute
to the peacetime functions of maritime security more cheaply then warships
designed for the full spectrum of warfare.
Sir Humphrey at The Thin
Pinstriped Line in a post entitled “The Royal Navy and Light Frigates - A solution in need of a problem?” has
argued against their utility. Sir Humphrey points that while a high end warship
can fulfill lesser roles, a vessel with lesser capabilities can not cope with
high end conflict. He notes that acquiring such vessels might come at the
expense of the full spectrum warships that currently make up the bulk of the
Royal Navy.
Sir Humphrey may have missed
an important point. It is true that that an expensive warship, like the Type 45
destroyer, or “The pinnacle of naval power” as Sir Humphrey describes them, can
fulfill any role given it, but will it be given any role?
Canadian scholar James Pritchard has written
about Gabriel de Sartine, Louis XV’s first secretary of the navy. He
superintended the reconstruction of the French Navy after British Admiral Sir
Edward Hawke smashed it at Quiberon
Bay in 1759. Having
managed the finances, he was intimately acquainted with the cost of outfitting
a fleet. He also presided over French naval strategy for a time after France
allied itself with the American colonists in 1778.”Sartine,” writes Pritchard
“was anxious to preserve the great hoard of wealth that the navy represented.
He may have feared to risk it without a guarantee of success.” He thrust
risk-nothing tactics on French commanders as a result. Better to conserve
precious ships, he believed, than hazard them in combat against the Royal Navy.
This is the problem that
faces modern naval leaders. Corbett’s emphasis on preserving costly assets
resonates with admiralties around the world. The cost, in both money and
industrial capacity, to replace a modern warship can make both politicians and
admirals loath to use them. The question then becomes: what use is a warship,
no matter how capable, if
they can’t or won’t be used.
The loss of a Type 45
Destroyer would be devastating for the Royal Navy. Between the cost and the
lack of industrial capacity it could almost literally not be replaced. Given
these facts, how likely is the British admiralty, or the politicians who
ultimately make the decisions, to hazard it in any but the most existential of
circumstances?
When naval ships become so
valuable that their loss becomes unthinkable they become unusable. Author
Robert O’Connell has written about this phenomenon in his book “Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy”.
Canada originally planned a follow-on order of 6 more Halifax class frigates
after the first 12 were ordered. A fleet of some 18 frigates and 4 air defence
destroyers was envisaged. Needless to say, this didn’t happen. We currently
have a force of some 12 frigates and 3 destroyers. The current plan is to
replace them with 15 Canadian Surface Combatants. Given the previous history of a continually shrinking
Canadian Navy, it is unlikely that all 15 will be procured.
What use will a force of
expensive and irreplaceable ships be? As well as having an unusable force, Canada is in
danger of having a pointlessly small force. One answer to this dilemma is to
look at smaller, less expensive, dare one say it, more expendable, ships. The
OPV, the Light Frigate, the “frégate de surveillance”, no matter what you wish
to call them, will have an important role to play in the formation a 'usable'
navy.
Julian Corbett
Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy, by Julian Stafford Corbett
Protector-class offshore
patrol vessel
Floréal Class Frigate, France
The Royal Navy and Light
Frigates - A solution in need of a problem? http://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.ca/2014/04/the-royal-navy-and-light-frigates.html
Louis XV's Navy, 1748-1762, A
Study of Organization and Administration
By James Pritchard
How to Measure an Aircraft
Carrier’s Worth
Sacred Vessels: The Cult of
the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy
Robert L. O'Connell
Canadian Surface Combatant
(CSC)
