As James Parker observes at Frontline Defence, it is hard to procure warships.
As he points out complexity and costs will only increase in the future. Factors
driving these costs include: last minute contract and design changes requested
by the purchasing governments; system integration complexities due to emerging
technologies; strained relationships between civilian and government work
forces; and variations in resource cost between the time of requirement
identification and contract signing.
In designing the National Shipbuilding Procurement
Strategy (NSPS) the
government of the day was trying, among other things, to maintain in-depth and
in-house expertise in war vessel design and construction by avoiding the need
to ramp-up an idle naval industry every few decades to build a couple of
complex warships.
This is an admirable goal which it was hoped could
be achieved by combining the construction of all government fleets so as to
reach a ‘steady state’ of building which delivered a new warship, or Coastguard
vessel, every year or so. What the current government is discovering is that
the cost of following this model is an aging navy in which warships, which were
purchased in a block buy over a shorter period of time, are not being replaced
as they reach the end of their design lives.
In fact the Liberals have promised to streamline building of navy frigates, but are
not clear on the number of ships to be acquired or how much they will cost. As
unlikely as it sounds, the government says that they are committed to
purchasing an undetermined number of warships for a price, which will include
designing and eventually building the new warships, that will be negotiated
through the prime contractor, Irving Shipbuilding of Nova Scotia, at a later
date.
It seems unlikely that any entity other than a
government would agree to purchase an unknown number of anything for an unknown
price, but perhaps it is necessary to move the process along.
As Parker notes, certain obstacles to timely warship procurement are common.
Some of the more frequent include last minute contract and design changes
requested by the purchasing governments as well as system integration
complexities due to emerging technologies. Add to this the fact that the period
of time from the decision to construct a ship to actually having a ship can
take years making it impossible to keep up with technological advances, let
alone integrate them, during that time period.
Given these factors it is imperative that any warships
that Canada does build include provisions for modality, a suitable growth
margin and enough flexibility built in to them to allow for the demands of
evolving technology and political requirements.
One way to try to increase the speed at which warships could be procured would
be to build the hulls of the flexible warships describe above equipped with an
existing sensor and weapons suite. Such a system is available in the Halifax-class
Modernization / Frigate Life Extension program.
The HCM/FELEX
project, along with other separately-funded projects within the Halifax-Class
Modernization program, brings enhanced capabilities which the Navy believes
will meet the needs required by new threats and changing operating
environments. These include systems include:
A
new command and control system;
Multi-Link;
New
radar suite;
Interrogator
Friend or Foe Mode S/5;
Internal
communications system upgrade;
Harpoon
missile system upgrade (surface to surface); and
Electronic
warfare system upgrade;
Long-range
infrared search and track system (SIRIUS); and
Evolved
Sea Sparrow Missile (surface to air).
By using these proven and in service systems as the
basis for a ‘first flight’ of new Canadian warships many of the delays inherent
in acquiring all new systems and their subsequent integration could be avoided.
Modern warships have a life-span that often exceeds
thirty years. In that time they can expect to be updated and refitted on a
regular basis. New Canadian frigates equipped in the same manner as our current
Halifax class could be updated with newer systems over the course of their
service, but in the meantime they would be available in a timely manner.
Why
is it So Hard to Procure a Warship? By James Parker
The
National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy: A Five-Year Assessment
Cost
and Canadian content concerns hover over warship plans By Murray Brewster
THE
DUAL MONOPOLY DILEMMA
Halifax-class
Modernization / Frigate Life Extension
