The government of Canada has recently revealed a new policy in relation to its
military procurement policies. While announcing a plan to acquire used F-18
Hornets from Australia to augment current RCAF aircraft, they also stated that
in future they would evaluate companies bidding for government contracts for
their "overall impact on Canada's economic interests."
Proposals will not only be considered based on cost,
technical requirements and industrial, technological and economic benefits as
they have been in the past. In future when bids are evaluated it will include
an assessment of bidder’s impact on Canada’s economic interests and any bidder
“responsible for harm to Canada’s economic interests will be at a distinct
disadvantage.”
The government says that the announcement marks the official launch of the open,
competitive process to replace Canada’s fighter jet fleet. They plan to begin
by establishing a list of suppliers, followed by extensive planning and
stakeholder engagement scheduled to take place throughout 2018 and 2019
followed by a contract awarded in 2022 and the first replacement aircraft to be
delivered in 2025.
How much of this plan relates to reality?
In Canada the entire process (apart from the development
of specifications) is under the
authority of Public Works, which uses much the same process to buy
fighter jets that it uses to buy any other product or service. The
new policy adds yet another layer to the process of military procurement. It is not even clear that these new policy
directives are even legal under international law.
In the past Canada has struggled even to provide
relatively simple search and rescue aircraft.
Even in a situation in which successive governments and the RCAF
maintained that obtaining these aircraft was their most important priority it
took decades to sign a contract for new aircraft. The same can be said of the
almost half century search for a Sea King helicopter replacement. In both these
cases it is important to remember that even at this late date there are no new
aircraft actually in service.
This is not
to say that there are not competent people in the civil service but, given that
they cannot even reliably pay themselves, is it possible for
rational observers to really believe that there is any likelihood of the
government maintaining its’ schedule and actually delivering a jet fighter, of
any kind, by 2025?
The time has come for Canadians and their government
to accept reality. The truth is that, as
currently constituted, we just can’t do this. We are not able to successfully
navigate the intricacies that such an expensive and complex procurement calls
for.
Fortunately there is a viable alternative.
We live in what might be called post-Westphalian
times. Westphalian sovereignty is the principle of international law that each
nation-state has sovereignty over its territory and domestic affairs. One of
the founding beliefs of the Westphalian ideal was that Sovereign states had an
absolute monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.
However, as Sean McFate has observed in his book “The Modern Mercenary-Private Armies and What They Mean for World Orderr” ,The
Westphalian belief that war is exclusively the privilege of the state does not
match historical reality. Throughout most of history, military force was marketized,
and waging war with for-profit actors was normal. Wealthy individuals and
groups regularly employed private armies to pursue their objectives-political
power, wealth, vendetta, glory and so on-creating a free market for force in
which military might was traded as a commodity and the nationality of suppliers
or purchasers meant little.
In modern times, for example, the US military has become
highly privatized, with contractors making up half of its force structure in
theaters of was and, it is argued, short of a national draft that country can
no longer fight a sustained war without private sector involvement.
In Canada the Armed Forces and the government have
long recognised the benefits of what might be called contact warfare. On demand
military services generally have greater utility or value then maintaining an equivalent full-time standing military force. In many cases private sector innovation can find
more efficient and effective ways of military objectives, sometimes sparing
blood and treasure.
For
example Public Services and Procurement Canada, on behalf of National
Defence, recently awarded a $480-million contract for Contracted Airborne
Training Services (CATS) to Discovery Air Defence Services Inc. The initial
10-year contract, with options to extend, could secure services until March 31,
2031, and the value of the contract could potentially reach $1.4 billion
The CATS program provides realistic combat readiness
training to pilots and aircrew. During these exercises, the aircraft pilot will
act in an aggressor role, allowing CAF personnel to learn and practise
defensive tactics to deter an attack. Discovery Air personal and aircraft even
provide Electronic Warfare training missions conducted by crews consisting of a
Discovery Air Defence Services Pilot and a DND Electronic Warfare Officer from 414 Electronic Warfare Squadron.
Contracts
such as these usually describe the number of hours of flight time that will be
available as well as the services performed during those flight hours. There is no reason that similar contracts
could not be signed, with the appropriate companies, for the air defence of
North America.
Westphalian fears of a loss of sovereignty created
by such a contract may be eased by the academic argument that providers of military support can be considered
legitimate actors in areas of conflict. Such providers, it is argued, borrow
legitimacy from the state that contracts the firm. Private firms do not operate
alone; they are hired and, at least marginally, directed by a state. By using
the established legitimacy of the state these firms are able to claim a degree
of legal legitimacy.
Imagine the benefits to Canada and to the
government. It would be up to the service provider to determine how best to
provide the service. It would be the responsibility of that company to determine
which aircraft were best suited for the mission and for procuring those
aircraft. The service provider would be accountable for all maintenance, support,
and disposal. It could be assumed that such a private military contractor (PMC)
would find the least expensive and most efficient ways to achieve these ends.
Further, unlike our current system, the choices that
the PMC made to achieve its contracted goals, the air defence of North America,
would not be constrained by imaginary industrial policies, or regional economic
balance or the need to keep impractical promises made in the heat of political
campaigns.
We must accept that our government and Department of
National Defence, as currently constituted, are not capable of fulfilling the
task of providing the appropriate aircraft in a realistic timescale for a reasonable
price needed for our defence. As long as the government of Canada and the
public who elect them choose to accept that as a reasonable state of affairs
then the procurement of such essential services from private military
contractors becomes the only viable alternative.
Government
launches open and transparent competition to replace Canada’s fighter aircraft
Replacing and Supplementing
Canada's Fighters
Defence
procurement strategy
Liberals'
new pro-Canada procurement caveat still being figured out
Liberals
pledge ‘continuous improvement’ of Phoenix in 2018 … but not a fix
The
Modern Mercenary-Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order
Sean
McFate
Government
of Canada invests in air combat training services
414
Electronic Warfare Squadron
Doppelgangers of the State: Private Security and
Transferable Legitimacy
Martha Lizabeth
Phelps
